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Abstract
The U.S. sub-prime crise developed in the last few months as a dangerous
syncope for the entire international financial system, recall for the rethinking of
market functionality, revealing the international institutional weakness in
financial system supervision on global scale. The mortgage volatility induced by
the international dereglementation and derivates contemporary burst,
correlated with a relaxed supervision framework, transformed progressively the
credit market into a system “bubble”, making possible the distortion of real
estates values toward those levels forced by creditors. Throughout a weakness
chain, many financial institutions, determined by a savage competition on this
sector, left away the prudence and borrowed money from different investors,
guarantying the long terms transactions, with short time derivates from
speculative short-term market, supplying the bubble. In this context, the
paperwork is meant to recall for reinventing the risks models, so that the crises
to be anticipated earlier than its development moment.
Keywords: globalization, financial crise, global economy,
monetary system, international management
The study is centered on the liquidity risk, considered as far, the
most important pillar of crises propagation chain, being in the same
time the most facile element in determining the market pressure as an
efficient early warning system. Credit risks, exchange rates risks or
real values depreciation risks are connected to liquidity lacks,
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the money need being the first moment for crise burst as the liquidity
is the first step in market stabilization process. The hazardous
behavior is practically determined by the creditor’s fear to loose the
possibility for drawing back their investment at those sufficient levels
to protect their values.
The credit risks, exchange risks or value market risks are
fundamental reasons conducting toward liquidity risks, being as well
the main transmission channels in case of a those crises. The market
falling and market bubbles start to develop released by credit,
exchange rates or real values deformation, into a liquidity crise as an
effect for market equilibrium tendencies. In fact, starting from this
point of view and describing this situation as a model, the liquidity
running provokes the market shocks, feed by the speculation behavior
for investment protection, conducting finally toward market values
correction.
Aglietta M. has been observed that „... the market sensibility is
perennial” at least such time as the financial transactions volume
exceeds a hundred times the real economy transactions volume [1]. If
the transaction’s maturity, base on speculation, is shorted more than
the market can support in terms of liquidity, especially in case of real
values reappraisal, with disconnecting the long term perspective to
short perspective, the market will fall facing with an avalanche of
closing the derivates options. The tendency of short or long position
closures on financial markets will require huge volumes of liquidity
throughout a short time interval. Transmitted as a contagious disease,
the appearance of a system crise will be inevitable and the market will
ask for and “ultimate borrower” [1].
Starting from the idea that nobody is able to manage separately a
market behavior, as sub-prime crise recently underlined, the
international financial system is a must to improve its institutional
possibilities for a immediate “financial pull”, based on central banks
system coordinated by international financial organizations (as
International Monetary Fund or Bank for International Settlements)
[6].
In this perspective, is needed first to redefine, on a theoretical
level, the mechanism of crise appearance and development. In figure
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1 it have been concentrated representatively the main components of a
systemic crise from global perspective, putting together the national,
regional and international components, under the governance of
international financial institutional architecture.
Figure 1: The financial crises functional model
Facing with this conceptual global risks mechanism, the
international financial institutions have only two strategies. First to
improve the supervision policies and instruments for a proper
detection of those risks capable to evolve into liquidity syncope, and
second to conduct the global market interventions, before or in time
of a crise happening. The crise acting behavior (in terms of
prevention, crise governance and finally decrement of negative
effects), is explained by an ensemble of an international policies and
strategies, based on four market priority vectors, as follows: global
information symmetrical system (A), supervision policies (B),
intervention mechanism (C) and global macro economical supervision
and adjusting mechanism (D).
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The preventive attitude should be based more on global criteria
for warning against speculative behavior deviations on markets in
relation with reasonable values limits for titles or mortgages. If we
understand the financial world as Soros G. presents in his last work
(“The New Paradigm of Financial Markets”),  being  a  reflexive  sum
of speculative behaviors, then the preventive attitude should combine
the supervision with active governance based on a Central Bank
System action, unfortunately inexistent as a coherent structure for
now.
The prevention should take as main pillar the supervision of
financial system policy in terms of Basel II Accord, but in a different
perspective. The capital requirements should be harmonized with
traditional values in new risk limits, without any chance for hiding the
market bubbles in appraisal. Derivates should be interdicted in
guarantying credit processes and the specialized option market should
be separated from banking system action. In fact the main reason
itself for present financial crise is the miss-understanding of the
separation between real economy and financial markets in terms of
speculation and investment ration of financial instruments.
The bad mix of long term titles designed for investment’s credit
with speculative derivates meant to protect in chain the same values,
conducts inevitable toward an over appraising of guarantees brought
in business and finally toward a functional crise of indebts. On the
edge between real economy, hungered for investments, and the
financial system, with a huge appetite for speculation, the information
asymmetry and macro-economical positive statistics can provoke a
market “euphoria”, corrected finally in case of a liquidity syncope,
through a general price falling as a functional crise. The generalized
bad loans collection process over the international banking system
(the last element of the weakness chain), together with the liquidity
running will conduct toward a system crise. The banking system
fundamental role in a moment of crise is to guarantee the loans and
the deposits with long term values, liquidities or mortgages, not on the
speculative bases as today does. A functional crise is able to transform
itself into a system crise just starting from banking system weakness
as the main transmission agent of a contagious need for liquidity.
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The immediate solution for global financial system problems is
to reinvent the solid credit base through banking system responsibility
in according their capital to fundamental values with no interference
with derivates market or generally with financial short term market,
sensitive to speculation. The Basel II Accord should approach more
profound the capital structure from the isolate perspective of banking
system itself as loan and deposits cautioner not like a speculator of
investors’ money. The return to the financial basis theory about the
primordial role of banking system is the most important pace toward
simplicity as a requirement into a global world.
Between real economy and speculative dimension of financial
markets exists, like a connection interface, the banking system
governed by central banks. So first, for improving the crise prevention
and response, we need a coherent trilogy, separately identified trough
three distinct level of market action, market governance and policy
framework, as follows: <“International Banking System” ↔ “Central
Bank System” ↔ “International Financial Institutions”>. These three
systems working together could assure the stability of international
financial system better than are doing for now on global level. In this
perspective the operational actions could be attributed to the
International Banking System (“healthy” returned to the primary value
of credit), the governing policy should be assigned to a possible
Central Bank System, the entire mechanism being harmonized from
political point of view by the international institutions architecture as
a cautioner responsible for global equilibrium.
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